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COMMENT
UNITED STATES V LEMON: JUDICIAL
CONSIDERATION OF RELIGIOUS
ASSOCIATION AS AN AGGRAVATING
FACTOR AT CRIMINAL SENTENCING
The first amendment prohibits the government from infringing upon an
individual's freedom of religion, freedom of association, and freedom of
speech.' In accordance with first amendment principles, no state may
criminally prosecute individuals for exercising their first amendment
rights.2 Consequently, a state is also precluded from using such constitutionally protected activity as a basis for aggravating a criminal sentence.
Yet, in recent months, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia has specifically used religious association and religious membership as factors for aggravating the criminal sentences of associates and
members of the Black Hebrew religion.3 Despite the well-established first
1. The first amendment provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, chs. 12 & 14 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
2. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (protesters permitted to
hold peaceful and orderly march); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) (conviction
reversed for violating breach of the peace ordinance that prohibited speech which "stirs the
public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest or creates a disturbance
. .."); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (conviction of Jehovah's Witness reversed for
violating city ordinance prohibiting use of sound amplification devices for reasons other
than news, athletic activities or issues of public concern); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943) (conviction reversed for distributing religious literature without first purchasing
license); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (state prohibited from requiring Jehovah's Witness to obtain certificate before soliciting religious contributions); Schneider v.
State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (conviction of Jehovah's Witness reversed for
distributing religious circulars and soliciting contributions without permit); O'Brien v.
United States, 376 F.2d 538, 542 (1st Cir. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 391 U.S. 367:
(1968) (sentence of war protestor may have been based on political expression rather than
illegal act of burning draft card); see generally A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 88, at
284 (1978).
3. United States v. Lemon, No. 82-2327 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); United States v.
Kegler, No. 83-219 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-1219 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 1983).
For a further discussion of the facts of these cases and the Black Hebrew religion, see infra
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amendment principles of freedom of religion 4 and freedom of association,
the district court concluded that these criminal defendants should receive
stiffer sentences for their criminal activity because they either associate
with or are members of the Black Hebrew religious sect.5
Most recently, however, in a case of first impression, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned one of
the two decisions of the district court, declaring in United States v. Lemon 6
that religious association cannot be considered as an aggravating factor in
a criminal sentencing proceeding.7 Despite traditional appellate deference
to trial judges in sentencing matters,8 the appellate court vacated the
length of the defendant's sentence and remanded the case to the district
court, reasoning that there had been an abuse of discretion and a violation
of the first amendment freedom of association.9 The circuit court emphasized that not until Lemon had a lower court so severely overstepped the
constitutional boundaries of the first amendment. 10
This Comment will utilize the circuit court decision in Lemon as a
means of exploring first amendment principles in the area of sentencing
criminal defendants. Part I will describe the factual background of the
Lemon case and will discuss the precise holdings and legal issues raised by
the district court and the circuit court decisions. Part II will set forth prior
case law, highlighting the first amendment principles needed to resolve the
Lemon case as well as discuss the general principles of criminal sentencing. Part III will address the presentence inquiry and will analyze the twotiered test enunciated by the circuit court in Lemon by examining its consistency with prior case law. Finally, Part IV will apply a more comprehensive constitutional analysis to the Lemon case and also suggest the
appropriate outcome of the resentencing hearing mandated by the circuit
notes 6-41, 174-78 and accompanying text. [Hereinafter these cases are cited as the Black
Hebrew Cases].
4. There are two clauses within the first amendment which protect the freedom of
religion. The "establishment" clause prohibits preference of religion over nonreligion while
the "free exercise" clause provides protection for the practice of all religions. U.S. CONST.
amend. I. In the Black Hebrew Cases, however, the government has interfered with neither
the establishment nor the exercise of the Black Hebrew religion. Instead, the government
has impinged upon the defendants' first amendment freedom of association. Lemon, 822327 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); Kegler, No. 83-219 (D.D.C. 1983). This Comment, therefore, will focus on prior case law concerning freedom of association under the first
amendment.
5. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
6. No. 82-2327 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983).
7. Id at 41-42.
8. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
9. Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at 40-42.
10. Id. at 41-42.
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court. In addition, this Comment will question the validity of criminal
sentences which are aggravated only in part by constitutionally invalid
factors.
I. THE Lemon Case: Facts, Holdings and Issues
The defendant in UnitedStates v. Lemon," was convicted in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia of interstate transportation of a stolen security' 2 for transporting a stolen check across state lines
and depositing it in a bank account. 3 At the sentencing hearing, Judge
Jackson was presented with a copy of the presentence report14 which contained information concerning Lemon's background. Specifically, the
11. No. 82-234 (D.D.C. 1982), vacated and remanded, No. 82-2327 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29,
1983).
12. This offense is defined by federal statute in relevant part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transports or causes to be transported, or
induces any person to travel in, or to be transported in interstate commerce in the
execution or concealment of a scheme or artifice to defraud that person of money
or property having a value of $5,000 or more . . . [s]hall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982).
13. Brief for Appellant at 7, Lemon, No. 82-234 (D.D.C. 1982). Lemon was indicted in
the District of Columbia in August 1982 for two separate violations of § 2314 after having
been arrested in Ohio for allegedly depositing one stolen and one counterfeit check in his
bank account. One month later, Lemon entered a plea of guilty to one count, while as part
of the plea agreement, the second count was subsequently dismissed. Id.; see also Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Review of Conditions of Release at 1, Lemon,
No.82-234 (D.D.C. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Government's Motion to Oppose Review].
14. One experienced trial attorney has described the typical presentence report in the
following manner:
The probation officer in charge of the case. .. [has the responsibility of preparing the presentence report for the court] narrating in detail the defendant's family
history (including childhood matters), school history, medical history, work history, military record, criminal record, circumstances surrounding the present offense (generally with an exploration of the events that led up to it, including any
unusual pressures on the defendant, extenuating circumstances, aggravating circumstances, and so forth; and sometimes with an indication of the defendant's
present attitude toward the offense), home and neighborhood environment, family
attitudes, financial status, present employment situation or prospects, prognosis
with respect to any medical or psychiatric problem, and other matters he thinks (or
has learned from experience with the court that the court thinks) relevant to sentence, which may include the defendant's religious attitudes. The probation officer's
report usually contains a sentencing recommendation, with supporting reasoning.
It summarizes and has attached to it any psychological or psychiatric reports that
have been made of the defendant.
A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 460, at 1-451 (3d
ed. 1978) (emphasis added).
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presentence report indicated that Lemon was currently an active member
of the Black Hebrew religion.' 5
Although religious affiliation is routinely found within the presentence
report, the introduction of religion in the Lemon case is significant because
the prosecution specifically requested that Lemon's membership in the
Black Hebrew religious sect be considered as a basis for aggravating his
sentence. m6 In a Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, the government
urged the judge to impose a "lengthy sentence" because Lemon was a
member of the Black Hebrew religion.1 7 The government asked that
Lemon's crime not be considered an isolated incident, but as part of a
nationwide pattern of criminal activity involving Black Hebrews.' 8 In an
attempt to link Lemon's crime to the illegal activities of other group members, the government pointed to similar crimes of fraud that had been
committed by other Black Hebrews. 9 Those crimes involved the fraudulent use of birth certificates, passports, airline tickets, credit cards and bank
accounts. 20 The government reasoned that a more severe sentence would
deter other Black Hebrews from committing similar crimes of fraud in the
2
future. '
The defense attorney in the sentencing hearing specifically requested
that Judge Jackson disregard the representations of the government concerning Lemon's membership in the Black Hebrew religion.2 2 The judge,
however, denied this motion without explanation. 23 The judge then im15. Presentence Report for Appellant, Lemon, No. 82-234 (D.D.C. 1982). Additionally,
the presentence report stated that Lemon's parents had been divorced since he was a child,
that he had received a Bachelor of Arts in Communications from Howard University, and
that he had been employed as an announcer and operator at the Howard University Radio
Station for almost 10 years. Id
The defense counsel in Lemon argued, however, that the government's information supporting Lemon's alleged membership in the Black Hebrew religion constituted unsubstantiated hearsay. The defense counsel pointed to the fact that the government had presented a
report by an unidentified source that Lemon was in the company of two Black Hebrews and
was riding in the car of a suspected member of the Black Hebrews at the time of his arrest.
Brief for Appellant at 4-10, Lemon, No. 82-234 (D.D.C. 1982).
16. Government's Memorandum on Sentencing at 6, Lemon, No. 82-234 (D.D.C. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Lemon Sentencing Memorandum]. In a related issue, the government
also recommended that the judge consider Lemon's membership in the Black Hebrew sect
when setting bail. Government's Motion to Oppose Review, supra note 13, at 4.
17. Lemon Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 16, at 6.
18. Id. at 5-6.
19. Id; Government's Motion to Oppose Review, supra note 13, at 4.
20. Lemon Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 16, at 5-6; Government's Motion to
Oppose Review, supra note 13, at 4.
21. Lemon Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 16, at 1.
22. Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings at 2-10, Lemon, No. 82-234, (D.D.C. 1983).
23. Id at 10.
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posed a sentence of sixteen months to four years-a sentence that was unusually harsh for a first offender with the defendant's background.2 4
The length of Lemon's sentence was then appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which vacated the
sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. 25
The circuit court began its analysis with a determination of whether the
defendant's alleged membership in the Black Hebrew religion or purported association with members of the sect had actually influenced the
length of Lemon's sentence. 26 Noting that Judge Jackson had failed to
provide an explanation for his selection of such an unusually harsh sentence,27 the circuit court found that several factors demonstrated that the
trial judge had considered Lemon's association with members of the Black
Hebrews as an aggravating factor at sentencing.28
The court first pointed to Judge Jackson's parole recommendation form,
prepared on the date of sentencing. 29 After ascertaining that Judge Jack24. Id at 14. On appeal, the government conceded at oral argument that the length of
Lemon's sentence was unusually severe for a first offender. Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at
13.
The sentencing practice that developed in the Lemon case cannot be dismissed as an isolated incident. The issue of Black Hebrew membership again surfaced as an aggravating
factor three months later, in the same court, in United States v. Kegler, No. 83-219 (D.D.C.
1983), appealdocketed, No. 83-1219 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 1983). The defendant had been convicted in a jury trial of two counts of interstate transportation of stolen property. Once
again, the government added to the list of traditional aggravating factors the fact that the
defendant was a Black Hebrew. In an attempt to correlate Black Hebrew membership directly with criminal activity, the government declared that "the defendant had shown no
intention to refrain from further illegal conduct by cutting ties with the Black Hebrews involved with her in this crime. Government Memorandum of Sentencing at 1, 6-7, Kegler,
No. 83-219 (D.D.C. 1983). In accordance with the government's request, Judge Jackson
imposed a sentence that appeared to penalize the defendant's Black Hebrew affiliation. Id
25. Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at 40.
26. Id at 13-14.
27. Id at 13.
28. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
29. Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at 14. Known as Form A.O. 235, it typically contains
the sentencing judge's comments regarding the suitability of parole in light of the defendant's recent offense, prior criminal background, and any mitigating or aggravating factors.
Id at 14 n.26. In the Lemon case, Form A.O. 235 included the following pertinent language: "[Lemon's] unwillingness to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney's Office in its investigation of an organization known as the Black Hebrews, whether or not he is a member of it,
casts considerable doubt on the genuiness [sic] of any expression of remorse or protestations
of reform." Report on Sentenced Offender by United States District Judge at 1,Lemon, No.
82-234 (D.D.C. 1983). At the time of Lemon's sentencing, the parole form did not require
the sentencing judge to explain the sentence imposed on defendant or resolve matters in
dispute prior to sentencing the defendant. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, were recently amended to eliminate these inadequate aspects of Form A.O. 235.
Nearly one year after the Lemon sentencing, on Aug. 1, 1983, a new rule, FED. R. CRIM P.
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son had given substantial weight to the government's representations of
Lemon's association with members of the Black Hebrews, the circuit court
concluded that it was reasonable to infer that the judge also had given
considerable weight to that information in selecting Lemon's sentence.3 °
The court also found significant Judge Jackson's express denial of defense
counsel's motion to disregard the government's representations of Lemon's
association with the Black Hebrews.3 Finally, the appellate court stressed
that on appeal both defense counsel and government counsel had conceded that Lemon's unusually severe sentence reflected Judge Jackson's
reliance on prejudicial information concerning the Black Hebrews.3 2
Having found that the sentencing judge did rely on the government's
representations concerning Lemon's association with the Black Hebrews in
setting the length of sentence, the circuit court then proceeded to analyze
the three separate but interrelated constitutional issues raised by this practice: (i) whether the government's actual evidence of Lemon's association
with the Black Hebrews was sufficiently corroborated and reliable to satisfy due process considerations; 33 (ii) whether the first amendment prohibits the consideration of religious association as an aggravating factor at
sentencing; (iii) whether Lemon's mere knowledge of Black Hebrew activities and his refusal to cooperate with the government's investigation of the
sect could serve as an independent basis for aggravating his sentence.
32 (C)(3)(d), became effective. Thus, the new rule will apply to the resentencing proceeding
in the Lemon case. Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at 15 n.29.
30. Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at 14-17.
31. Id at 17-18.
32. Id at 18-19.
33. Id at 37-40. The Lemon appeal was not restricted to the first amendment issue of
freedom of association. Lemon also contended that the sentencing judge violated his due
process rights under the fourteenth amendment by considering the government's uncorroborated hearsay allegations that he belonged to the Black Hebrew religion. The circuit court
found that the sentencing judge had violated the defendant's due process rights by relying
on inaccurate, unsubstantiated representations of the government regarding Mr. Lemon's
association with the Black Hebrews. Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip. op. at 20, 37-40. The court,
however, explained that at the resentencing hearing, the government would have an opportunity to present new, reliable evidence linking Mr. Lemon's crime to the illegal aims of the
Black Hebrew organization and establish that the defendant's crime was committed in furtherance of the organization's illegal goals. Id. at 40. But the Lemon court recognized that
even if the government successfully meets its burden on remand, it will have severe difficulty
overcoming the protection provided to the Black Hebrew religion by the first amendment.
d. at 36, 42.
The scope of this Comment is limited to the first amendment, which provides a more
stringent constitutional analysis than the fourteenth amendment. Under a due process analysis, the court would apply a balancing test which falls short of the strict scrutiny test mandated by the first amendment. Thus, this Comment will only test the Lemon case under the
most rigid constitutional standard of review. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 474-77, 501-63.
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In addressing the issue of due process, the court found the government's
evidence of Lemon's purported association with the Black Hebrews so severely unreliable as to require exclusion of this evidence in the sentencing
determination. 4 The circuit court then took its analysis one step further
and declared that even if the evidence had been reliable, Lemon's association with members of the Black Hebrews would still be an improper subject for consideration under the well-established principles of the first
amendment." Finally, the court rejected the government's argument concerning the defendant's alleged refusal to cooperate in the investigations of
the Black Hebrews.36
Based on these constitutional rulings, the circuit court vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.3 7 The court
stated that the government would have an opportunity at the resentencing
hearing to present additional evidence to justify the sentencing judge's use
of Lemon's association with the Black Hebrews as an aggravating factor.3 8
In order to use religious association as an aggravating factor, the court
explained that the evidence must reliably demonstrate that Lemon intended to further the illegal activities of the Black Hebrews3 9 or that
34. Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at 37-40.
35. Id. at 40. The circuit court suggested the appropriate test for determining whether
affiliation with a certain group is protected by the first amendment freedom of association:
Association with the Black Hebrews, whether or not their beliefs were ultimately
determined to be religious, is protected by the broad guarantee of freedom of association unless the groups were found to be a sham whose members did not sincerely share the beliefs they asserted, but only used them cynically to conceal a
criminal conspiracy.
Id at 32. The court further noted that "[s]incerity can be the only test, for any inquiry into
the truth or falsity of beliefs is barred by the first amendment." Id at 32 n.49; see, e.g.,
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944); Founding Church of Scientology v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
36. Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at 40.
37. Id.
38. Id
39. Id. The circuit court suggested that the strongest evidence of the defendant's intent
to further the illegal aims of the Black Hebrew religion would be reliable evidence substantiating that the proceeds of Lemon's crime "were intended to benefit the Black Hebrews." Id
at 35. The court further explained that
[t]his does not mean . . . the government must necessarily show that the proceeds of the offense for which the defendant was convicted were intended to benefit
the Black Hebrews. Such a showing would of course be the strongest evidence of
the defendant'sintent to further the illegal aims of the Black Hebrews, but it is not
the only evidence that would establish the requisite intent and satisfy the first
amendment.
Id The court failed, however, to provide specific examples of ways to satisfy the intent
requirements. This Comment will conclude that prior case law mandates that the only evidence that may be used to establish intent is evidence showing that the proceeds of Lemon's
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Lemon had sufficient knowledge of the illegal activities of the Mlack
Hebrews to permit the judge to treat his refusal to cooperate in government investigations as an aggravating factor.4" The circuit court emphasized, however, that the government's showing would have to satisfy the
"heightened degree of scrutiny" mandated by the first amendment.4"
The central issues raised by the Black Hebrew Cases are whether the
presentence report can legitimately contain religious association and
whether religious association can ever be used to aggravate a criminal sentence. The government's presentencing procedure of asking defendants
whether they practice a religion and with whom they associate arguably
interferes with the defendants' first amendment freedom of association.
Moreover, assuming judges inadvertently obtain such information during
presentencing proceedings, there may be constitutional limitations on the
use of that information.4 2
If it is determined that in appropriate cases judicial consideration of religious association is sanctioned by the first amendment, then it will be necessary to ascertain what first amendment limitations, if any, exist. Thus, it
will be crucial to determine what religious goals are beyond the protection
of the first amendment, and whether the Black Hebrew religion encomcrime were intended to benefit the Black Hebrews. See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
40. Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at 41. The circuit court further stated that if the government fails on remand to provide new, reliable evidence to support the use of religious
association as an aggravating factor, "the sentencing judge should clearly express in the
record his intention to disregard the government's representations on this matter in imposing
a sentence." Id
41. Id. at 36, 42.
42. See infra notes 65-86, 141-50 and accompanying text. This Comment recognizes
that the Black Hebrew Cases may also be analyzed under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. It is unnecessary, however, to analyze the Black Hebrew Cases
under both the first and fourteenth amendments because a first amendment analysis will
subject the Black Hebrew Cases to the most rigorous standard of review provided under the
Constitution-strict judicial scrutiny. A strict scrutiny analysis is appropriate because the
first amendment right of association is considered fundamental under the Constitution. See,
e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
522-23 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). Under
the strict scrutiny test, the government must demonstrate that it has a compelling interest
which justifies its interference with a fundamental constitutional right. See infra note 46-47
and accompanying text. The standard of review for equal protection is generally the rational basis test. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). Under the
rational basis test, the court will determine whether the governmental burden on an individual's fourteenth amendment rights is rationally related to a legitimate government end. Id
Thus, if a law fails the least stringent standard of review, it will logically fail a more stringent standard. Similarly, a law upheld under the toughest standard of review will most
likely be upheld under a more relaxed standard.
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passes unprotected goals. In essence, the analysis will have to isolate
which activities the first amendment protects on the basis of freedom of
association.
In the following section, this Comment will criticize the Lemon Court
for disregarding the issue of whether the presentence report can legitimately contain the religious association of the defendant. Moreover, it will
examine whether the circuit court's holding is consistent with prior case
law on the first amendment. This Comment will further determine
whether the circuit court would have reached the identical holding even if
it had employed a pure first amendment analysis without intermixing due
process considerations.
II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF FIRST AMENDMENT
LAW AND CRIMINAL LAW

A.

Background

Unlike the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of religion,
freedom of association is not expressly found within the first amendment.4 3
Freedom of association, however, is implicitly guaranteed by the first
amendment and thus, is subject to the same analysis as the enumerated
first amendment rights."
Generally, principles of first amendment law dictate that the courts must
implement the strict scrutiny test when a state directly or indirectly interferes with an individual's freedom of association.4 5 Only a compelling
state interest will tip the scales in favor of the state. 46 Thus, if the state
fails to present such an interest, the law will be struck down as unconstitu43. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 543 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
45. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. at 524; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. at 460-61. Most frequently, however, the courts employ a balancing test, providing
the state with a greater opportunity to protect its interests. Under the balancing approach, a
state must show that its interest outweighs the first amendment interest of the individual.
See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 580-84.

46. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. at 524. See also Jehovah's Witness in State of
Washington v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 504-08 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (per
curiam), afl'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam) (pregnant woman could be forced to submit
to blood transfusion, over her religious objection, to save the life of her child); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943) (state may prevent individuals from physically
harming or exploiting their own children; Supreme Court prohibits adults from using children as street proselytizers); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 1917 U.S. 11 (1905) (state may force
all citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs, to obtain vaccinations in order to protect the

health and safety of the community).
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tional for infringing upon the individual's freedom of association.4 7
Before turning to relevant case law on the first amendment, it is useful to
briefly review the criminal law principles which form the backdrop for this
discussion. Case law on the issue of criminal sentencing generally falls
into three broad categories: (i) the propriety of the length of the sentence; 48 (ii) the fairness of the procedure that was employed in selecting
and imposing the sentence; 49 and (iii) the propriety of the judge's consideration of certain aggravating or mitigating factors in determining the length
of incarceration.5 0
Judicial decisions on the length of sentence are of limited number, for it
is in this area that appellate courts most frequently defer to the discretion
of the trial judge. 5 ' The judge is required only to observe the maximum
and minimum sentence limitations imposed by statute.52 As long as the
sentence remains within these statutory guidelines, the judge has full discretion in selecting the length of incarceration. 3 Rarely will a judge be
reversed for imposing a sentence that is so excessive as to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment.5 4
47. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. at 524; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 461.
48. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
51. See generally A. CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at §§ 126-128. Although the majority of
jurisdictions disallow appellate review of sentencing, the number of jurisdictions providing
for sentencing review is steadily increasing. The current trend gained momentum in 1976
when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of various death penalty statutes providing for automatic review of sentencing in capital cases. For discussion of these cases, see
Liebman & Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate
MentalDisorderas a MitigatingFactor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757, 762-77 (1978). Nevertheless, even
in those jurisdictions where review is available, appellate courts often avoid sentencing issues by remanding troublesome cases to the original sentencing judge for resentencing.
Many appellate judges believe the trial court judge is in the best position to tailor the sentence to fit the offender because the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the behavior
of the defendant in court. See generally A. CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at §§ 126-128.
52. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) ("A sentence imposed by a federal
district judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to review."); Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958). Cf. Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 366 (1958)
(Supreme Court set aside sentence upon second appeal: "The district court appears not to
have exercised its discretion in light of the reversal of the judgment but, in effect to have
sought merely to justify the original sentence.") See generally A. CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at
§§ 126-128.
53. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
54. Recently, in Solem v. Helm, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983), the Supreme Court found that a
habitual criminal cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
for committing a seventh nonviolent felony. In Helm, a habeas corpus petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment under a South Dakota recidivist statute for writing a bad check
in the amount of $100.00. The Supreme Court held that Helm's criminal sentence consti-
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The bulk of the decisions on criminal sentencing relate to the fairness of
the sentencing process. For example, the courts have established constitutional safeguards to ensure that the information heard by the judge is reliable," that the judge- actually considers the available information in making
has
an individualized sentencing determination,5 6 and that the defendant
57
an opportunity to address the court on the question of sentencing.
The final category-the selection of aggravating and mitigating factors-is the primary concern of this Comment. The courts have generally
recognized that sentencing judges have broad discretion in selecting the
tuted cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment since it was disproportionate to his crime.
Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Powell distinguished the Helm holding from the
Court's decision in a similar case, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). In Rummel, the
Court upheld a life sentence imposed under a Texas recidivist statute following defendant's
third felony conviction for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. The Helm Court noted that
the Texas statute in Rummel provided rehabilitated prisoners with the opportunity for parole, unlike the South Dakota statute in Helm. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the South Dakota law granted the governor power to pardon or commute a life sentence, the Court refused to equate executive clemency with the possibility of parole. The
Court stated that parole is part of the rehabilitative process whereas commutation is an ad
hoc exercise of clemency. Most significantly, the Court held that even if Helm's prison sentence was commuted, he would merely become eligible for parole but would not be guaranteed parole. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that in light of Helm's minor offense, the
possibility of parole was improperly excluded from his criminal sentence. Id. at 3016.
55. The sentencing judge must exercise "informed discretion." United States v. Tucker,
404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972). This requires that the judge not act on "assumptions" that are
"materially untrue." Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948). Sentences which have
been based on unsubstantiated hearsay were reversed on appeal. See United States v. Bass,
535 F.2d 110 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (sentencing judge prohibited from relying on uncorroborated
hearsay concerning defendant's other criminal activities which defendant denied); United
States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972) (sentencing
judge prevented from considering unsubstantiated hearsay in a presentence report in imposing sentence).
56. In United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971), a sentencing judge was
found to have abused his discretion where he sentenced a selective service violator to five
years in prison without considering all available sentencing information. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court judge had acted improperly
by handing down a "mechanical sentence" in defiance of Congress' implied legislative intent
to impose a lesser sentence where appropriate. Specifically, the Court found the sentencing
judge abused his discretion by refusing to consider the mitigating factors surrounding the
case, including the defendant's religious beliefs, good character, model behavior, and willingness to serve in a civilian capacity. Id at 972.
57. See generally A. CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 231-34. The formal inquiry by the
sentencing judge and the response by the defendant as to why the sentence should not be
imposed is known as "allocution." Approximately half the states recognize the "right" of
allocution in a variety of contexts. Id See, e.g., Brown v. State, 235 Ga. 644, 220 S.E.2d 922
(1975) (state constitutional right); Columbus v. Herrell, 247 N.E.2d 770 (1969) (court rule);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1200 (West 1972) (statutory provision).
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kind of information58 and sources59 upon which to base a sentence. 60 In
determining the length of incarceration, the sentencing judge evaluates the
information contained within the presentence report. 6 1 A sentencing judge
is encouraged to consider all of the aggravating and mitigating 62 aspects of
the defendant's background and character, as well as the circumstances of
the offense. 63 Given the liberal evidentiary guidelines, a sentencing judge
is rarely reversed for considering too much information.'
Having identified the general first amendment and criminal law principles governing this area, it is now appropriate to move to specific prior
cases to extrapolate constitutional requirements governing the use of protected first amendment activity as an aggravating factor in criminal
sentencings. The following discussion will focus on basically three types of
cases which will be described as the Disclosure Cases, the Communist
Cases and the Bail Cases. After examining each of these groups of cases,
58. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 446. "A trial judge may appropriately conduct
an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may
consider, or the source from which it may come." See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
247 (1949) (A sentencing judge should consider the "fullest information [available] concerning the defendant's life and characteristics."). In the federal court system, Congress has
incorporated these principles into statutes by providing that: "[N]o limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a convicted
offender which a federal judge may consider for sentencing purposes." 18 U.S.C. § 3577
(1982).
59. A sentencing judge may also consider "responsible unsworn or 'out of court' information relative to the circumstances of the crime and to the convicted person's life and
characteristics." Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959). Such use of hearsay information, however, is subject to certain minimal due process safeguards. See supra note 55.
60. See supra notes 58-59; see generally A. CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at §§ 69, 85-90.
61. See supra note 14.
62. Aggravating factors are circumstances surrounding a crime which add to the defendant's guilt and increase the defendant's length of incarceration. In contrast, mitigating
factors are extenuating circumstances which lessen the defendant's guilt and reduce the defendant's length of punishment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (5th ed. 1979).
63. See Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585-86 (sentencing judge properly considered the murder and other factors surrounding the kidnapping in determining the appropriate sentence).
64. See generally A. CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 225-26. Nevertheless, there have been
those instances where a sentencing judge has been found to have abused his discretion. See,
e.g., United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1973) (allegation of personal bias
required judge's disqualification from presiding over case where sentencing judge announced that he sentenced all selective service violators to thirty months in prison); United
States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1971) (sentencing judge refused to consider mitigating factors surrounding the case); People v. Jacque, 131 Ill. App. 2d 365, 266 N.E.2d 514
(1970) (sentencing judge failed to set a sufficient time period between minimum and maximum terms to provide incentive for rehabilitation); People v. Lillie, 79 Ill. App. 2d 174, 223
N.E.2d 716 (1967) (sentencing judge considered past offenses in setting the minimum, instead of the maximum, prison sentence).

19831

Judicial Consideration of Religion

this Comment will propose a comprehensive framework for first amendment analysis of the Lemon case.
B.

The Disclosure Cases

The government's presentencing procedure of asking defendants
whether they practice a religion and with whom they associate arguably
interferes with the defendants' first amendment freedom of association.
To resolve this issue, it is necessary to analyze prior case law.
Many constitutional issues concerning disclosure of association have
arisen in the context of an individual's application to the state bar. A
state's criteria for bar admission was challenged by the Supreme Court in
Schware v. Board of Examiners.65 In Schware, the Supreme Court reversed New Mexico's refusal to allow Schware to take the bar exam on the
ground that he was unfit to practice law because he was a former member
of the Communist Party and thus, of bad moral character.6 6 In reversing
the state's decision, the Supreme Court found that the state had no rational
justification for its decision because there was no evidence that Schware
participated in illegal activities as a member of the Communist Party.67
Similarly, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of questions which appeared on the application for admission to the California
state bar in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California.68 In Konigsberg, the
California state bar refused to admit the petitioner because he refused to
answer a question on the bar application concerning his membership in
the Communist Party.69 The state argued that the information was necessary for a thorough investigation of his qualifications.7" In upholding the
state's decision, the Supreme Court balanced the competing interests of the
state and the petitioner, concluding that the disclosure of prior associations
was a legitimate government concern. 7' The Court found that the state
could deny admission to the bar on the ground that an applicant refuses to
65. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).

66. Id at 232-38. The state also considered Schware's prior arrests and use of aliases in
evaluating his character. Id at 240-43.
67. Id at 239-40, 243-47.
68. 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (KonigsbergII). The Supreme Court heard the Konigsberg case

for the first time in 1957. In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957)
(Konigsberg I), the Supreme Court remanded the case to the California State Supreme
Court, finding no rational basis for the state's refusal to admit Konigsberg to the bar. The
state had argued that Konigsberg's refusal to answer questions concerning his past membership in the Communist Party supported the inference that he was of bad moral character and
advocated the violent overthrow of the government.
69. 366 U.S. at 37-38.
70. Id. at 40-44.
71. Id at 51-52. See, e.g., Martin-Trigona v. Underwood, 529 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975).
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respond to relevant questions even though the state could not base its decision on an affirmative answer to those questions.7 2 Thus, the Court concluded that the grounds for disqualification were more limited than the
scope of the inquiry.73
In Shelton v. Tucker, 4 the Supreme Court was confronted with the
question of disclosure in a different context.7 5 In Shelton, the Supreme
Court struck down a statute which required every teacher in a state-supported school or college to disclose all organizations with which he or she
had been associated during the past five years. 7 1 The Supreme Court applied a balancing test, finding that although the state may have a legitimate
interest in inquiring into a teacher's associations, it could use a less restrictive alternative 77 to achieve this end. 78 Thus, the Court emphasized the
impropriety of the scope of the inquiry.79
More recently, in the case of Baird v. State of Arizona, ° the Supreme
Court appears to have retreated from its holding in Konigsberg. The
Baird case involved a petitioner who was denied admission to the state bar
on the ground that she refused to answer a question on the bar application
poncerning her past membership in any subversive organization. 8 In a
plurality opinion, the Supreme Court struck down the state statute on the
basis that the first amendment prohibits a state from denying an individual
72. 366 U.S. at 52-53.
73. Id The KonigsbergH rationale was upheld in subsequent cases dealing with similar issues. See, e.g., Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401
U.S. 154 (1971) (requiring bar applicant to answer limited questions concerning "knowing
membership"); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971) (reversing denial of admission to bar because
questions were overly broad and beyond legitimate state interest).
74. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
75. Id.
76. Id
77. Id at 488. In Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), the Supreme Court laid the
groundwork for the least restrictive means requirement. In Schneider, the Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who had been convicted of violating a municipal ordinance which required that an individual obtain a police permit in order to distribute religious literature or solicit contributions on behalf of his religion. The Court
reasoned that the purpose of the town ordinance-to keep the streets free from litter-could
be accomplished by a less restrictive means. Specifically, the Court suggested that the town
could prosecute those individuals who actually threw paper on the street, instead of suppressing the legitimate exercise of speech and press. See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See generally L. TRIBE, supra
note 1, at ch. 14.
78. 364 U.S. at 488-90; see also NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Dilmore v.
Stubbs, 636 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1981).
79. 364 U.S. at 488-90.
80. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
81. Id at 1-5.
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access to a profession or penalizing an individual because he or she has
certain beliefs or belongs to a political organization.8 z Additionally, the
Court stressed that under the first amendment, a state has limited power to
inquire into a person's beliefs or associations.8 3 The Supreme Court determined that in order for a state to probe into an individual's beliefs and
associations, the state must show both that the inquiry is necessary to protect a compelling state interest and that there is no less restrictive alternative for achieving the legitimate end.8 4 The Court stressed that such broad
inquiries might deter individuals from joining an association of their
choice. 5
The DisclosureCases illustrate that a state may have a legitimate interest
in inquiring into an individual's association. That interest, however, must
be weighed against the individual's freedom of association under the first
amendment.8 6 First Amendment principles further dictate that the scope
of inquiry cannot be unnecessarily broad.
C

The Communist Cases

In addition to cases discussing whether a state may require disclosure of
an individual's associations, several cases address constitutional problems
which arise once it is established that an individual belongs to certain organizations. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the right of an
87
individual to join the political group of his choice. In several cases,
members of the Communist party have challenged the constitutional validity of the so-called membership clause of the Smith Act.88 That clause
82. Id at 6-8.
83. Id at 6.
84. Id at 6-8.
85. Id.at 6. Cf.In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945). In Summers, the Supreme Court
upheld the exclusion of a conscientious objector from the Illinois state bar on the ground
that he refused to take a mandatory oath in support of the state constitution. The Supreme
Court found that the interests of the state bar outweighed the conscientious objector's deeply
rooted beliefs. The Court concluded that each state has ultimate control over the members
of its bar if its requirements do not offend the first and fourteenth amendments. 325 U.S. at
570-73.
86. See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
87. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290
(1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951). For further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
88. The Smith Act provides in relevant part:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of
any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes
thereof-Is]hall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than
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prohibits membership in any organization which advocates the overthrow
89
of the United States government by force or violence.
In Dennis v. United States,9" the first case to interpret the constitutional
validity of the Smith Act, the Supreme Court relied on the clear and present danger test in upholding the membership clause. 9 1 The Dennis Court
found high-ranking members of the National Board of the Communist
Party guilty of conspiracy to teach and advocate the violent overthrow of
the government by reorganizing the Communist Party. 92 The Court applied a balancing test to determine whether the likelihood of danger to the
government outweighed the Communists' first amendment protections of
freedom of association and freedom of speech. 93 After balancing the competing interests of the parties, the Court found that the activities of the
Communist leaders constituted a clear and present danger to society because the group was prepared to make an attempt to overthrow the government. 94 Although the Court acknowledged that the Communists had
not made an attempt to overthrow the government, the Court concluded
that the mere existence of the conspiracy constituted a clear and present
twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States
or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his
conviction.
Pub. L. No. 87-486, 62 Stat. 808 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982)).
89. Id
90. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
.91. Id at 502-17. The development of the clear and present danger test spanned nearly
fifty years. The clear and present danger test orginated during World War I in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), where the constitutionality of the Espionage and Sedition
Acts were challenged under the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. In
Schenck, the United States Supreme Court explained that "the question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent." During the Cold War, in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the
Supreme Court limited the application of the clear and present danger test. The Yates
Court developed a balancing test which weighed the likelihood of unlawful action against an
individual's first amendment freedoms of speech and association. For a further discussion
of Yates, see infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. By the late 1960's, however, the
Court narrowed the clear and present danger test further into a more focused test in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court held that individuals may not be penalized for exercising their first amendment right of advocacy of
action unless the advocacy is directed to or likely to incite others to unlawful action.
92. 341 U.S. at 516-17.
93. Id. at 509-11.
94. Id The Supreme Court adopted the rule of clear and present danger from the
lower court opinion written by Chief Judge Learned Hand. Chief Judge Hand stated: "In
each case courts must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
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danger to society. 95
The Supreme Court narrowed the clear and present danger test discussed in Dennis, six years later, in Yates v. United States.96 In Yates, the
Supreme Court reversed the convictions of a number of low-ranking members of the Communist Party who were convicted of conspiring to over97
throw the government under the membership clause of the Smith Act.
The Supreme Court found that the Smith Act did not prohibit advocacy in
the abstract, but instead, prohibited advocacy of action.98 In conclusion,
the Supreme Court determined that the clear and present danger test articulated in Dennis must be limited to situations where the individual is
urged to take immediate or future action and not merely where the individual believes in taking action. 99
Finally, in Scales v. UnitedStates,' °° the Court clarified the Dennis and
Yates decisions and provided a useful framework for similar association
cases. The Supreme Court acknowledged that "quasi-political parties or
other groups. . . may embrace both legal and illegal aims."' 0 ' The Court
determined that the government can punish only those active group members that have knowledge of the group's illegal aims and the specific intent
to carry them out.'0 Since the membership clause does not prohibit mere
membership in the Communist Party, the Court stated that the government cannot convict those members who adhere to the lawful aims of the
10 3
group.
Similarily, in Noto v. United States,'14 the Supreme Court emphasized
the need to establish specific intent. 105 The Court stated that specific intent
95. 341 U.S. at 510-11.
96. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
97. Id
98. Id at 312-27.
99. Id
100. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
101. Id. at 229. In Scales, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between a group that
embraces both legal and illegal aims and a technical conspiracy. The Court noted that a
technical conspiracy is defined only by its criminal purpose. Therefore, the activities of conspiracy members are not protected under the first amendment. Id See, e.g., United States
v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978) (first amendment protection does not attach to membership in the Mafia because the goal of the organization is to commit crimes). Accordingly,
membership in the Mafia may properly be considered as an aggravating factor at sentencing.
102. 367 U.S. at 229-30; see also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. at 15-16; Noto v. United
States, 367 U.S. at 299-300.
103. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. at 229. "If there were a... blanket prohibition of
association with a group having both legal and illegal aims, there would indeed be a real
danger that legitimate political expression would be impaired.
Id
104. 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
105. Id at 299-300.
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must be judged by a strict standard to ensure the protection of legitimate
political expression and association under the first amendment. 0 6 In conclusion, the Supreme Court found the membership clause of the Smith Act
specific intent to
constitutional because it punished only those with the
10 7
bring about the violent overthrow of the government.
Six years later, the Supreme Court applied the legal principles articulated in Scales and Noto to Eljbrandt v. Russell.' In that case, the Court
tested the constitutional validity of the loyalty oath administered to all
Arizona state employees.' 0 9 The Court found the loyalty oath unconstitutional under the first amendment because it made mere membership in the
United States Communist Party a criminal act." 0 Unlike the Smith Act,
the Arizona law failed to limit punishment to those Communists having
the specific intent to further the illegal aims of the organization. " 'I In conthat "guilt by association" has no
clusion, the Supreme Court emphasized
2
place in our criminal justice system.'
The legal principles extrapolated from the DisclosureCases and Communist Cases were incorporated into the Supreme Court's analysis in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.' In Keyishian, faculty members of the State
University of New York challenged the constitutional validity of state statutes and regulations requiring state employees to sign a certificate swearing that they had never belonged to the Communist Party.' "4 The stated
purpose of the law was "to prevent the appointment or retention of 'subversive' persons in state employment."" 5 Under this statutory scheme,
106. Id The Court stated that specific intent:
must be judged striclissimiluis, for otherwise there is a danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of such an organization, but not specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to violence might be punished for his
adherence to lawful and constitutionally protected purposes, because of other and
unprotected purposes which he does not necessarily share.
Id
107. Id at 298-300. In Noto, the Court reversed the conviction of a Communist Party
member because he did not "present[ly]" advocate the overthrow of the government. The
Court noted that under the Smith Act, future advocacy was not criminal.
108. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
109. Id at 12-13.
110. Id at 16-18.
111. Id.
112. Id at 19; see also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957);
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 136 (1942).
113. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
114. Id.at 589-93. The New York loyalty statutes and regulations are best known as the
"Feinberg Law." Under the Feinberg Law, the Board of Regents is required to formulate
rules and regulations for the disqualification or dismissal of persons from the public school
system. Id at 593-95.
115. Id at 591-92.
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failure to sign the certificate would result in dismissal from employment. 16 The Supreme Court found the statutory language overly broad in
that it excluded all members of the Communist Party from state employment without requiring a showing of the individual's specific intent to further the unlawful aims of the organization." 7 The Court also noted that
mere membership in the Communist Party could not be used by the state
to support a finding of bad moral character to justify dismissal. " 8 In conclusion, the Court held the loyalty statutes were unconstitutional because
they were overly broad and effectively deprived Communist Party members of their freedom of association under the first amendment." 9
Finally, in UnitedStates v. Robel,'2 0 a member of the Communist Party
challenged the validity of section 5(a)(1)(D) of the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950 which prohibited the employment of Communists in
defense facilities. 2 ' Upon review, the United States Supreme Court found
the statute unconstitutionally broad because it penalized all members of
the Communist Party without considering active membership and specific
intent.' 22 The Court concluded that the government could protect national security by selecting a less restrictive means which would not
abridge the individual's right of association protected by the first
23
amendment.
24
The Supreme Court clarified the Robel analysis in its final footnote.
The Court explicitly stated that it did not apply a balancing test in Robel
but instead, limited its analysis to the constitutional infirmity of the statute.' 25 In dictum, however, the Court noted that a balancing test may be
appropriate on occasion.' 26 Specifically, the Court suggested that given a
narrowly drawn statute, the government's interest in national security
116. Id
117. Id at 605-10.
118. Id

at 607; see also Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).

119. 385 U.S. at 605-10; see also Pico v. Board of Educ., 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Elrod v.
Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Goguen v. Smith,

471 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1972), at'd,415 U.S. 566 (1974). The Supreme Court also found the
statutes unconstitutionally vague because they failed to regulate conduct with "narrow specificity." Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. at 597-604. See, e.g., United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (court also
found violation of due process).
120. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
121. 64 Stat. 992, 50 U.S.C. § 784 (a)(1)(D) (1976).
122. 389 U.S. at 265-66.
123. Id. at 267-68.
124. Id. at 268 n.20.
125. Id.
126. Id at 266-68.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 33:187

could possibly outweigh the individual's right of association depending
127
upon the type of employment.
The Communist Cases demonstrate that associations and organizations
may have both legal and illegal goals. Yet, all members may not share the
organization's illegal goals. These cases also demonstrate that only those
active group members who join an organization with the knowledge of the
organization's illegal aims and who have the specific intent to further those
illegal aims may be criminally punished for their membership in the
group.
D.

The Bail Cases

Cases involving bail determinations have also provided the courts with
an opportunity to balance first amendment interests against the interests of
the state. In 1950, in Williamson v. United States, 2 ' Communist Party
leaders were convicted of conspiring to advocate and teach the violent
overthrow of the United States government. 2' 9 After the defendants' convictions had been affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. 130 The
government asked that bail be revoked pending certioraribecause the defendants posed a clear and present danger to the national security of the
United States.' 3 ' Writing as Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit, Justice
Jackson stated that under the first amendment the courts may not deny
bail to members of political groups because of anticipated but uncommitted crimes. 132 Thus, Justice Jackson explained that courts may not utilize
33
their discretionary privileges contrary to the first amendment.
Similarily, in United States ex rel Means v. Solem, 134 the United States
District Court for the District of South Dakota held that the state trial
court was in violation of the law when it granted American Indian Movement leader Russell Means bail on the stipulation that he comply with one
127. Id at 266 n.17. Employees who hold nonsensitive positions in defense facilities do
not pose as great a threat as those who hold sensitive positions. Id
128. 184 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1950), affd sub nom. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951). This case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the constitutionality
of the Smith Act. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
129. 184 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1950).
130. Id at 281.
131. Id
132. Id at 282. Jailing persons to protect society from "predicted but unconsummated"
criminal acts may be carried to such extremes that "I am loath to resort to it .
Id
133. Id. at 283.
134. 440 F. Supp. 544 (D. S.D. 1977).
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condition for release. 135 Means was granted bail on the condition that he
refrain from participating in various American Indian Movement activities
36
such as marches, assemblies, making speeches, and writing literature.
The district court found the condition unconstitutional because it infringed
upon the defendant's first amendment rights of freedom of association and
freedom of speech. 137 The court stated that only a "compelling state interest" can justify the invasion of first amendment liberties. 138
The Bail Cases indicate that either a clear and present danger or a compelling state interest will outweigh the individual's first amendment right
of freedom of association. These cases also illustrate that members of
groups unpopular with the government may not be punished for their anticipated but uncommitted crimes. Finally, the Bail Cases demonstrate
that courts are prohibited from granting or denying discretionary privileges in violation of first amendment freedoms of association and speech.
PUTTING PRIOR CASE LAW IN PERSPECTIVE

III.
A.

Legality of Inquiring into Defendant's Religion

The common shortcoming of the court's decisions in the Black Hebrew
Cases is the failure to address the threshold issue of whether the
39
presentence inquiry into a defendant's religion is constitutionally valid. 1
It is the thesis of this Comment that failure to recognize this threshold
40
question violates constitutional principles of first amendment law. 1
After reviewing the prior case law, it is apparent that the inquiry into the
defendant's religion in the presentence report requires a balancing of the
interests of the state against the first amendment freedoms of the individual. 14 ' Although the state may have a legitimate interest in obtaining such
scope of the inquiry must be reasonable and thus, not
information, the
142
broad.
overly
The state's interest in inquiring into the religion of the defendant is to
obtain full disclosure of all relevant information in pursuit of its goal of
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id at 549-50.
Id
Id at 550.
Id at 551.

139. See Lemon, No. 82-2327 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983). Kegler, No. 83-219 (D.D.C.

1983). Moreover, research has not revealed a single case which discusses the propriety of
such an inquiry. Although the defendants in Lemon and Kegler did not challenge the govemnment's presentence inquiry into their religion, the issue is of sufficient constitutional importance to be acknowledged by the court.
140. See infra notes 141-51.

141. See supra text accompanying notes 71, 78.
142. See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
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protecting the welfare of its citizens.' 4 3 Disclosure of religious affiliation
may provide the court with additional information concerning the defendant's values and attitudes toward society. For example, regular participation in church activities may reflect a defendant's substantial ties to his or
her community. Active involvement in church-sponsored programs
designed to benefit children or the disadvantaged would certainly be an
important mitigating consideration at sentencing. The state's interest in
full disclosure, however, must be weighed against the defendant's interest
in freedom of religious association." Admittedly, the state's interest in
protecting its citizens is a substantial concern. Therefore, the state's limited questioning regarding religious association appears to be within the
requirement of the Disclosure Cases. 4 ' Since the mere inquiry does not
appear to place an undue burden on the defendant's first amendment freedom of religious association, the court may uphold the scope of the
presentence inquiry.' 4 6
In failing to recognize the inquiry issue, however, the court does not
acknowledge the problem that exists for the defendant who adheres to no
religion or who associates with unfavored groups. For example, are the
first amendment rights of that individual unconstitutionally infringed
upon because his or her sentence is not mitigated or is aggravated on the
basis of the group or religion he or she does or does not associate with? If
the court were to extend this line of reasoning, any inquiry concerning
association would be inappropriate since the defendant has the right to
choose his associations without the threat of being penalized by the sentencing judge for choosing one association over another.
It is unclear how future courts will resolve this question, since guidance
from Supreme Court cases is inconsistent. Perhaps this issue will, therefore, merit attention from the Court in the near future. Under the Konigsberg analysis, the Court would probably uphold the inquiry, but would
prohibit a sentencing judge from taking affirmative action based upon the
inquiry. 47 Conversely, the Baird analysis would arguably preclude the
government from making the inquiry concerning the defendant's association unless it could demonstrate that the inquiry is narrowly tailored to
48
protect a compelling state interest.
Under the Baird analysis, it is more likely that the Court would find the
143. See supra notes 14, 58-60.

144. See supra text accompanying notes 71, 78.
145. See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
146. Id.

147. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text; see also Shelton, 364

U.S.

at 479.
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presentence inquiry constitutionally invalid.' 49 For example, the Court
may take the position that only if an association presents a clear and present danger to society may the government inquire into a defendant's association on the presentence report. On the other hand, the Court may
retreat from its strong first amendment language in Baird and find compelling the government's argument that an effective criminal justice system
requires full information about all defendants and their associations. If
the Court finds this a sufficiently compelling state interest, the presentence
inquiry would be found constitutional even under the Baird analysis.' 50
Although the state may have a legitimate interest in making the initial
presentence inquiry into the defendant's religion, the Supreme Court has
determined that there are limits on how that information may be used.' 5
Thus, assuming the Court upholds the constitutional validity of the
presentence inquiry, the question now arises whether the disclosure of religion on the presentence report may be used as an aggravating factor at
sentencing.
B.

Legality of Using Religious Association as an Aggravating FactorExtrapolatinga GeneralFramework/orAnalysis

The single greatest flaw in the Lemon circuit court decision is the interweaving of three essentially unconnected standards of constitutional analysis.'"I Throughout the opinion, the court mixes its due process discussion
of the reliability of the factual evidence concerning the defendant's Black
Hebrew associations with its first amendment analysis of the propriety of
considering any evidence on this subject matter at all. For example, the
court begins by analyzing the government's showing in terms of due process reliability, then switches to the question of the first amendment parameters concerning any use of such information, and then, in an apparent
turnabout, asks whether the information was sufficiently reliable to satisfy
due process in an area so affected by first amendment concerns. 153 In the
midst of all this, the court interweaves the separate question of the defendant's refusal to cooperate with government authorities by turning over information about the Black Hebrews. 54 This issue is treated
by the court
155
issues.
amendment
first
and
process
due
of
as a mixture
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
Lemon, No. 82-2327 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983), slip op. at 19-36.
Id. at 36.
Id
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This Comment, however, is concerned exclusively with the first amendment questions raised by the use of religious association as an aggravating
factor in a criminal sentencing proceeding. Careful reading of the circuit
court decision demonstrates that the court adopted the following holding:
an individual may not be penalized for associating with members of a prohas illegal aims and the inditected organization unless the organization
56
vidual intends to further those aims.'
Although prior case law has not directly addressed the issue of whether
a convicted criminal may have his or her religious association considered
as an aggravating factor at sentencing, the Communist Cases and the Bail
Cases do highlight relevant principles of first amendment law and suggest
appropriate concerns in structuring an analysis. In accordance with prior
law, the proper analysis must balance the concerns of the first amendment
with the interests of the criminal justice system. Furthermore, the general
principles of criminal law dictate that a sentencing judge must consider the
"fullest information" available regarding the defendant's life and charac157
teristics in determining the length of incarceration.
In accordance with the Communist Cases,'5 8 the framework for analysis
of this issue should carefully distinguish between crimes that arise from a
general illegal aim of an organization and crimes committed by members
of an association as isolated incidents.' 59 Thus, the inquiry should determine whether the individual's activity constitutes an associational aim and
furthermore, whether the individual in question subscribes to that aim. 6 °
The proper framework for analysis therefore must include three-tiers.
Tier I would ask whether the association to which the defendant belongs
has illegal goals.' 6 ' Tier II would determine whether the crime the defendant committed constitutes one of the illegal goals of the association.' 6 2
Finally, Tier III would apply the Scales test to determine whether the defendant is an active member of the organization and committed the crime
with the knowledge and specific intent of furthering the organization's illegal goals.' 63 Under this analysis, a state may interfere with the defendant's
freedom of association only if all three tiers are satisfied.' 6 4
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
in this

Id. at 34-35.
See supra notes 14, 58-60.
See supra notes 87-127.
See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 100-23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. The three-tiered analysis developed
Comment may be applied equally to cases involving Black Hebrew association as
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Using its mixture of due process and first amendment analysis, the circuit court in Lemon derived a two-tiered constitutional framework. The
court's framework looked first to whether the organization had legal or
illegal goals. Assuming that the organization did have illegal goals, the
court's framework then considered whether the particular individual's
crime was committed with the knowledge of those illegal goals and an
65
intent to further those goals.
The primary difference between the circuit court's framework and the
analytic framework extrapolated from prior case law in this Comment is
that the court failed to establish a middle tier for determining whether the
crime the defendant committed constituted one of the illegal goals of the
association. The court subsumed this issue within a discussion of the individual's intent to further the illegal goals of the organization. 66 Moreover,
the court suggested that this issue was more properly a matter of due process analysis rather than first amendment analysis. 167 As the foregoing
discussion has shown, 16 ' however, the issue is quite properly one of first
amendment law. Thus, it merits a separate tier of analysis.
The court's framework also failed to specifically consider whether the
defendant is an active member of the organization. As the previous discussion also has demonstrated, 69 this is a threshold inquiry in applying the
Scales test of intent to further the illegal goals of the organization. Although the circuit court adopted the Scales test, it inexplicably omited this
key element of the analysis.
The final difference between the court's analysis and the framework extrapolated in this Comment is that the court recognized an exception to the
Scales test. After declaring the general invulnerability of the first amendment freedom of association, the court then retreated from its position and
stated that a defendant could be penalized for failing to cooperate with the
government in turning over information about the individuals with whom
he or she associates.' 70 The court attempted to narrow this exception by
well as cases involving Black Hebrew membership, since consideration of either infringes
on an individual's first amendment freedom of association. Therefore, the Kegler case may
also be tested under the proposed first amendment analysis. This Comment recognizes,
however, that on appeal Kegler has not challenged the constitutional validity of her sentence. Id
165. Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at 34-35.
166. Id.at 35-36.
167. Id. at 35 n.53. "Although the first amendment does not require such a showing, the
due process clause may." Id.
168. See supra notes 44-47, 87-138, 152-64 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 100-27, 158-64 and accompanying text.
170. Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at 36.
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limiting the principle to cases in which the government has reliably
demonstrated that the defendant had personal knowledge of the organization's illegal activities,' 7 1 and further emphasized that the government has
a heavy burden to sustain in making this showing.' 72 Yet, it is evident that
such an exception could consume the rule. For example, every time that
the government desires to reap the benefits of "guilt by association," without overstepping the protection of the first amendment, the government
could simply demand a defendant to reveal information about those with
whom he or she associates and if the defendant fails to disclose the information, the government could request the judge to increase the defendant's
sentence. In order to preserve the sanctity of the first amendment protections in this area, it is essential that73 the protections be absolute and that the
court's exception be abandoned.
Having determined that the analysis developed in this Comment provides a more comprehensive framework than the circuit court's analysis,
the next section will apply this more extensive framework to the facts of
the Lemon case. The result of the three-tiered test will then be compared
to the conclusion reached by the circuit court. The following section will
also suggest the appropriate outcome of the resentencing hearing mandated by the circuit court.
171. Id at 28-29, 36.
[E]ven this limited use of representations about the defendant's associations with
a constitutionally protected group, in the absence of a reliable showing that he had
the intent to further its illegal purposes, must withstand the heightened degree of
scrutiny. . . necessary to insure that the defendant is not penalized for mere association with members of a religious group.
Id. at 36.
172. Id at 36, 42.
173. It would seem that the circuit court in Lemon felt bound to create this exception
because of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S.
552 (1980). In Roberts, the Court held that a sentencing judge may properly consider as an
aggravating factor a defendant's failure to cooperate with a government investigation of a
criminal conspiracy in which the defendant was a confessed participant. However, careful
assessment of the Roberts decision reveals that it is unnecessary to read an exception into the
first amendment analysis in order to preserve the Roberts holding. Unlike the defendant in
Lemon, Roberts did not deny that he had information which would prove useful in the
government investigation. In Lemon, however, not only did the defendant deny any knowledge of the Black Hebrew organization, but there was no reliable evidence to the contrary.
Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at 27, 40.
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IV.

PUTTING THE BLACK HEBREWS TO THE TEST: APPLICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA TO THE FACTS OF THE

Lemon
A.

CASE

Applying the Three-Tiered Test to the Current FactualRecord

We begin the analysis by closely examining the nature and goals of the
Black Hebrew organization. The Black Hebrews are an established religious organization."' The Black Hebrew religion has existed since
1963,' and worldwide membership in the religion is estimated between
15,000 and 100,000.176

The association has concrete religious beliefs

founded in Biblical history' 7 7 and has specifically designated religious
practices and holidays."17

Under Tier I of the framework for analysis, we must first consider
whether the Black Hebrew religion has any illegal objectives.' 79 The government stressed that the following facts reflect the purported criminality
of the sect: a number of individual Black Hebrews have committed crimes
of fraud in the past;180 twenty-four members of the Black Hebrew religion
are currently being sought by the FBI for their participation in fraudulent
criminal activity;' 8 ' these fugitives are being harbored from justice by
members of the Black Hebrew religion who have established houses
throughout the United States where fugitives can receive food, clothing
and shelter; 8 2 and finally, according to the government, the twenty-four
174. See generally THE

BLACK HEBREWS:

AN ENGLISH SUMMARY OF THE SPECIAL

COMMITTEE REPORT, Jerusalem (June 13, 1980) (Report on file with Catholic University
Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Black Hebrew Report]. This document was prepared by a
committee of the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, to determine the immigration policy of the
Israeli government toward members of the Black Hebrew religious sect. See generally
Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1983, at Dl, col. 1. The Black Hebrews are not to be confused with the
Black Jews of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Jews, also known as the Falashas, have practiced
their ancient, isolated form of Judaism for centuries. V. FERM, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

271 (1945).
175. Black Hebrew Report, supra note 174, at 3-4.
176. Id at 3.
177. Id at 3-5. The Black Hebrews believe they are descendants of the Ten Lost Tribes,
a sect of ancient Hebrews who were exiled from Israel because of their sins. The group
believes they have paid for their sins and now wish to return to Israel to establish a permanent homeland. Id
178. Id Members of the Black Hebrew sect choose hebrew names, follow a strict vegetarian diet, wear head coverings and prayer shawls, and circumcise their sons. They observe
the Sabbath and celebrate the traditional High Holy Days with the exception of Hanukkah.
In addition, the Black Hebrews have created their own holy day known as Kingdom Passover, which marks the beginning of their journey back to Israel. Id.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
181. Government's Motion to Oppose Review, supra note 13, at 4.
182. Id
RELIGION,
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fugitives had committed fraudulent crimes specifically to benefit the Black
Hebrew community.' 3 The central flaw in the government's presentation,
however, is that these facts, even when accepted as true, do not demonstrate that the Black Hebrews--as an organization--endorsecriminal activity. They merely show that certain individual members of the Black
Hebrew religion have committed crimes. The same could be said of members of almost any religion. The government simply failed to establish that
crime represents a general goal of the Black Hebrew religion.
Let us assume for the moment, however, for purposes of this analysis,
that the government had succeeded in satisfying Tier I. We would then
proceed to Tier II and ask whether the defendant's crime constitutes one of
the association's illegal goals." 4 Only if the government could establish
that crimes of fraud were an illegal goal of the Black Hebrews and that
Lemon committed a crime of fraud to benefit the Black Hebrew religion,
would the second tier of the analysis also be satisfied." 5
Clearly, Lemon committed a crime of fraud. The government asserted
86
that this crime was intended to benefit the Black Hebrew organization.1
However, all of the available evidence indicates that Lemon committed his
crime for personal gain. As the government itself acknowledged, Lemon
i8 7
spent the proceeds of the stolen check to purchase personal items
These items included clothing, shoes and stereo equipment. 8" It is significant also that Lemon committed the crime only eight months after he lost
the job he had held for ten years. 8 9 Lemon explained to the court that his
crime was motivated by financial need, 9° and that he had been too proud
to ask his family for assistance because of the high value they placed on
professional achievement. 9' Thus, the evidence indicated that Lemon's
criminal involvement was motivated by his financial status rather than his
membership in the Black Hebrew religion.
Let us once again assume, for the sake of argument, that the government
had satisfied its burden under Tier II. We would then continue to Tier III
and ask whether the defendant is an active member of the association and
determine whether he joined the association with the knowledge of its ille183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
Id
See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 13, at 16.
Id.
Presentence Report for Appellant, supra note 15, at 11-13.
Id at 9-13.
Id. at 11-13.
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gal goals and with the specific intent to carry them out. 19 2
First, the government failed to establish that Lemon was an active member of the Black Hebrew religion. Given the limited information concerning Lemon's ties to the Black Hebrews, we may only conclude that Lemon
associates with individual members of the Black Hebrews. 193 Lemon's
friendship with members of the sect does not demonstrate that he himself
is a member of the religion.
Similarly, the government offered no evidence that Lemon had knowledge of the alleged criminal goals of the organization. The government
also did not present any evidence that Lemon joined the organization with
the specific intent to carry out illegal goals of the Black Hebrew religion. It
is important to recognize that in this case, there was no direct relationship
between the crime committed and the organization. As discussed earlier
under Tier II, Lemon's crime of fraud was motivated by his personal need
rather than by his membership in the Black Hebrew religion. 9 4
Thus, application of the three-tiered test produces the identical result as
the one reached by the circuit court under its two-tiered approach: the
sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. The
additional tier and the more extensive analysis simply provide additional
constitutional support for this result.
B. The Resentencing Hearing
On remand the circuit court stated that the government will have an
opportunity to produce new evidence of any illegal activities by the Black
Hebrews, any participation by Lemon in such illegal activities, and any
knowledge he might have about these activities even if he did not participate in them. 9 5 At the resentencing hearing, the government can attempt
to satisfy the three-tiered test and thereby overcome the first amendment
protections that attach to the Black Hebrews and to Lemon's alleged association with the organization's members. But as the circuit court emphasized, the government must make a very substantial showing to overcome
the "heightened degree of scrutiny" generated by the first amendment
protections. 196
It appears very unlikely that the government will be able to produce any
additional evidence to discredit the Black Hebrew organization. Despite
more than a decade of government surveillance of this religious associa192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
See supra note 15.
See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
Lemon, No. 82-2327, slip op. at 40.
Id at 36, 42.
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tion, no government agency has as yet produced any credible evidence establishing that the organization as a whole subscribes to illegal goals.' 9 7
The evidence thus far has merely shown isolated criminal activities by
some members of the organization. 98 This evidence is simply insufficient
to establish the criminality of the entire organization. Similarly, an indepth study of Black Hebrews in Israel failed to provide any credible evidence to support allegations of crimes by the sect. Indeed, police statistics
in Israel demonstrated that criminality among the Black Hebrew sect was
less than among other Israeli citizens.' 9 9
It cannot be anticipated whether the government will be able to uncover
any new evidence of Lemon's participation in or knowledge of illegal activities by Black Hebrews. It might be speculated, however, that the reasons why the government relied on "guilt by association" in the original
record in Lemon was that there simply was no concrete evidence to support the government's allegations. The resolution of this issue, however,
will have to await the government's presentation at the resentencing
hearing.
Although the government may have a legitimate interest in conducting
the initial presentence inquiry into the defendant's religious associations, 2" this Comment has demonstrated that there are substantial limitations on how that information may be used. Under the appropriate
constitutional analysis, the sentencing judge should determine whether the
defendant's crime arose from the illegal goals of the association to which
he belongs.2"' Only if the defendant is found to be an active member of
the association and to have committed the crime in furtherance of the association's illegal goals, may religious association be considered as an aggravating factor at sentencing.2 °2
C Appellate Review of Cases Involving Religious Association as an
Aggravating Factor
The Lemon case presented a clear-cut factual situation for first amendment analysis, in that the only aggravating factor considered by the trial
judge was constitutionally protected activity. In many other cases, however, appellate courts will be confronted by the more complex situation of
a criminal sentence which may have been based partially on valid aggra197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See generally Black Hebrew Report, supra note 174, at 15-18.
See supra notes 18-20, 179-83 and accompanying text.
Black Hebrew Report, supra note 174, at 15-18.
See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
See supra note 101-03 and accompanying text.
See supra note 102-03 and accompanying text.
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vating factors (such as a lengthy prior record or a particularly heinous
present offense) and only partially on the defendant's constitutionally protected religious association. In these cases, the appellate courts will have
to address an issue left unresolved by the Lemon decision: the ability of
certain valid aggravating factors to sustain a sentence which is partially
tainted by constitutionally invalid aggravating factors.
This issue is resolved, at least in the first amendment context, by the
Supreme Court's decision in Stromberg v. Calfornia20 3 and its progeny.2
203. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). In Stromberg, a member of the Young Communist League was
convicted of violating a statute which prohibited the public display of a red flag for any of
three reasons. On appeal, the California Court of Appeals questioned the constitutional
validity of the first clause of the statute. Nevertheless, the California Court of Appeals sustained Stromberg's conviction because the remaining clauses of the statute were constitutionally valid. The United States Supreme Court refused to support the state court's
reasoning. The Supreme Court noted that Stromberg's conviction was based on a general
jury verdict and there was no record to show under which clause her conviction had been
obtained. The Court reasoned that since there was a danger that the jury may have found
Stromberg guilty of violating the constitutionally invalid clause of the statute, the conviction
of Stromberg could not stand. Id at 368-70.
204. In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), the defendant was convicted under a
state statute of public desecration of the American flag. On appeal, Street's conviction was
affirmed. Street then appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the ground that his
conviction was unconstitutional because it was based solely or in part on his spoken words.
The Supreme Court noted that Street was governed by the same principles as Stromberg.
As in Stromberg, Street's conviction was based on a general verdict. In Street, however, the
verdict was handed down by a judge, not a jury. The Supreme Court stated that under the
general verdict it is impossible to ascertain whether Street's conviction was based solely on
constitutional grounds. Moreover, the Court reasoned that there was a danger that the judge
had considered both Street's spoken words and his act as "intertwined" when determining
his guilt under the statute. Thus, the Court concluded that since Street's conviction may
have been based on both constitutional and unconstitutional grounds, the judgment must be
reversed. Id. at 588, 594.
In the recent Supreme Court decision of Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983), the
holdings of the Supreme Court in Stromberg and Street were limited to first amendment
activity. A Georgia state court jury found Zant guilty of murder and imposed the death
penalty. Prior to sentencing, the trial judge instructed the jury that in order to sentence
respondent to death, they must find and identify in writing one or more statutory aggravating circumstances. The jury subsequently identified two aggravating circumstances in writing and imposed the death penalty.
While Zant's appeal was pending, the Georgia Supreme Court found in another case that
one of the aggravating circumstances, on which Zant's sentence was based, was unconstitutionally vague. Nevertheless, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the death penalty in respondent's case because the other aggravating circumstance supported the death penalty.
103 S. Ct. at 2750.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that a death sentence that is supported
by at least one valid aggravating circumstance neMl not be vacated because the second aggravating circumstance is invalid. Unlike Stromberg, the Court reasoned that the jury did
not return a general verdict but indicated the specific aggravating circumstances on which it
based its decision. The Court noted that under Georgia law, a jury needed only one valid
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Under these decisions, any ambiguity in the source of the sentence must be
resolved in favor of the defendant.2 °5 Where a sentence may be based on
both a constitutional and unconstitutional factor, it must be reversed to
eliminate the possibility of an unconstitutional basis for decision.2 "6
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has focused on the constitutional parameters of inquiring into a defendant's religion on the presentence report and then using the
defendant's religious association as an aggravating factor at criminal sentencing. The discussion has shown that although the circuit court reached
the correct result in Lemon, it failed to employ the proper constitutional
analysis. The court in the Black Hebrew Cases inadvertently failed to
make the initial determination of whether the government may inquire
into the defendant's religious association in the presentence report. In
resolving this issue, this Comment has concluded that a narrow inquiry
may satisfy the criminal justice system's legitimate goal of gathering information necessary to protect the health, safety and general welfare of the
public. Assuming the inquiry is valid, the discussion developed a comprehensive three-tiered test for determining whether religious association can
be considered an aggravating factor at criminal sentencing proceedings.
In many respects, it is surprising that these issues have never before been
addressed by the courts. The lack of case law seems to reflect the universal
recognition that a sentencing judge cannot apply a standard of "guilt by
association." It was not until the Black Hebrew Cases that a judge dared
to penalize defendant's for their choice of associates. The decisive action
by the circuit court in Lemon served to reaffirm the sanctity of the fundamental principles embodied in the first amendment.
Shely J. Spiegel

aggravating circumstance to support the death penalty. Moreover, the Court distinguished
the situation in Zant from Street in that the Zant jury sentence was based on two independent aggravating circumstances, while the Street jury verdict was based on a single count
indictment where the defendant had engaged in both constitutionally protected and constitutionally unprotected conduct. In conclusion, the Supreme Court emphasized that there
was no danger that the death penalty in Zant was based on an aggravating circumstance
which involved protected first amendment activity. Thus, the death penalty in Zant could
not be vacated on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the holdings in Stromberg and
Street. 1d at 2746-50.
205. See supra notes 203-04.
206. See supra notes 203-04.

